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ABSTRACT It is common to argue that politicians make selective use of evidence to tacitly
reinforce their moral positions, but all stakeholders combine facts and values to produce and
use research for policy. The drug policy debate has largely been characterised in terms of an
opposition between evidence and politics. Focusing on harm reduction provides useful ground
to discuss a further opposition proposed by evidence advocates, that between evidence and
morality. Can evidence sway individuals from their existing moral positions, so as to “neu-
tralise” morality? And if not, then should evidence advocates change the way in which they
frame their arguments? To address these questions, analysis of N= 27 interviews with
stakeholders actively involved in drug policy and harm reduction debates in England, UK and
New South Wales, Australia, was conducted. Participants’ accounts suggest that although
evidence can help focus discussions away from values and principles, exposure to evidence
does not necessarily change deeply held views. Whether stakeholders decide to go with the
evidence or not seems contingent on whether they embrace a view of evidence as secular
faith; a view that is shaped by experience, politics, training, and role. And yet, morality, values,
and emotions underpin all stakeholders’ views, motivating their commitment to drug policy
and harm reduction. Evidence advocates might thus beneﬁt from devising strategies to
morally and emotionally engage audiences. This paper aims to develop better tools for
analysing the role of morality in decision-making. Using tools from disciplines such as moral
psychology is relevant to the study of the politics of evidence-based policymaking.
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Introduction
Too often, support for evidence-based drug policy has beenframed in terms of opposites. In this characterisation,evidence is portrayed as the clean, scientiﬁc, neutral and
value-free solution to a dirty, partisan, ideological, and value-
laden politics. This article transcends this dualistic view by
introducing another element–that of morality. The concept of
morality is deployed as a framing device for understanding harm
reduction debates in drug policy. Throughout the paper, the term
evidence refers to scientiﬁc evidence, or evidence which has been
produced by deploying established scientiﬁc methods in a given
ﬁeld. Evidence is organised hierarchically (Petticrew and Roberts,
2003), and although there are some differences across ﬁelds of
inquiry, evidence hierarchies tend to culminate with systematic
reviews of Randomised Controlled Trials. Evans (2003) suggests
that evidence hierarchies have mostly been constructed through
an exclusive focus on effectiveness of an intervention. A more
nuanced discussion is in order, but for the sake of brevity, the
focus will remain on evidence of effectiveness of given interven-
tions as a matter of political priority.
The concept of harm reduction, and particularly its proclaimed
moral ambiguity, is reﬂected upon. A rhetorical shift away from a
formal commitment to harm reduction–which entails reducing
drug-related harm to users–and towards promoting abstinence
and recovery–which entail abstaining from drugs and reaching
sobriety–has reinserted elements of morality that had remained
latent in UK and Australian drug policy (Home Ofﬁce, 2010;
Berridge, 2012; Lancaster et al., 2015). Although harm reduction
began as a moral and political crusade to advocate for the rights
and health of drug users, it was later incorporated into a much
less openly moral model that emphasised economic arguments
for drug treatment in order to justify them publicly and politically
(Roe, 2005). Scientists, advocates, and practitioners deployed a
value-free rhetoric to justify their endorsement of harm reduc-
tion, shunning values in favour of cost-beneﬁt-driven, evidence-
based rigour. Some commentators have argued that defending an
amoral position is preferable because it tacitly allows for a
diversity of moral positions, whilst winning political backing
(Keane, 2003; Beirness et al., 2008). Others disagree based on
limited achievements and loss of political control, arguing instead
for an openly moral and humanist stance (Hathaway, 2001;
Ezard, 2001; Hunt, 2004; Pauly, 2008).
In this context, evidence is relied upon as a tool to de-politicise
and de-moralise harm reduction debates. Yet the potential of
evidence to affect deeply held views is called into question: can
evidence sway individuals from their existing moral positions, so
as to “neutralise” morality? And if not, then should evidence
advocates change the way in which they frame their arguments?
To address these questions, I analysed data from 27 interviews
with stakeholders involved in drug policy advocacy, research,
lobbying and decision-making in England, UK and New South
Wales, Australia. Both countries, along with all Anglophone
countries, feature as ‘liberal’ in welfare regime typology categor-
isation (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Approaches to welfare deﬁne
the relationship between state and citizen. In liberal states, there is
a clear tendency to place the burden of responsibility on the
individual, which is visible in established welfare policies such as
means-testing, workfare models, and punitive sanctions against
the unemployed (MacGregor, 1999; Dee, 2013; Eriksson and
Pratt, 2014). These shifts have become even more pronounced
since UK Conservatives and Australian Liberals have been in
government (Taylor‐Gooby, 2016; Deeming, 2017). Analysis of
these two cases can give way to theoretical contributions that may
be relevant in the context of other Anglophone countries.
In the following article, instances where evidence was used
selectively to support stakeholders’ deeply held views will be
discussed, exploring to what degree this was instrumental or
value-based (or both). Literature on the use of evidence in policy
has largely focused on instrumental selection of evidence to
support a political or strategic aim, but less on how this relates
with stakeholders’ value-based, moral positions. Instances where
exposure to evidence enabled individuals to change their views on
drug policy issues deserve some attention, because, on the surface,
this fulﬁls the wishes of evidence advocates to overcome politics
and morality as barriers to evidence-based policymaking. How-
ever, the conﬂation of morality and moralism by stakeholders
leads to a widespread supposition that morality only exists on the
side of the argument that is opposed to that backed by evidence.
This is both problematic and limiting. Liberal moral principles.
alongside values, emotions, and experiences, underpin stake-
holders’ commitment to harm reduction. Whilst policy analysis
would beneﬁt from further engaging with morality, evidence
advocates need to reﬂect on their own morality, for the purposes
of framing arguments and for engaging audiences.
Findings suggest that selection of evidence is not merely
motivated by instrumental objectives, but rather underpinned by
stakeholders’ values and existing moral positions. While evidence
might affect people’s understandings of drug policy issues, it does
not necessarily change their deeply held views. People’s values
and morals shape perceptions, thus making fundamental shifts in
policy much more difﬁcult to achieve despite available evidence.
Stakeholders’ commitment to drug policy and harm reduction
seems to be motivated by direct experience or emotional exposure
to issues drug users face. Interestingly, some participants sug-
gested that if scientiﬁc evidence is accompanied by exposure to
personal stories or direct experiences, stakeholders are more likely
to engage by way of empathy. This is discussed with reference to
moral psychology literature, and particularly moral foundations
theory, which offers some insight into how morality operates and
how it can be mobilised, potentially providing advocates with
ideas about how to engage their audiences.
Morality, policy and harm reduction. Morality is an instrument
that individuals use to order practices and activities into cate-
gories of ﬁrst principles, or right and wrong (Fischer, 2004).
Morality is made up of values, beliefs, emotions, experience,
principles and deliberations. It is constructed in dialogue between
the individual and the multiple environments the individual
experiences. In debates about evidence-based policymaking,
morality is often mistaken with moralism; hence, it is con-
ceptualised as subjective, reactionary, and inimical to progressive,
sound, objective reasoning. Yet, morality underpins all reasoning
and has no single political or ideological valence (Haidt, 2013;
Hunt, 1999). Studies in moral psychology (Lakoff, 1996; Haidt,
2013) and sociological studies of morality (Hunt, 1999) are useful
reminders that morality is multiple. Haidt (2013) posits that what
is regarded as moral by a liberal might be viewed as immoral by a
conservative because liberal and conservative moralities are fun-
damentally different; that is, different moral foundations under-
pin political positions. Such foundations are primary in shaping
people’s views and feelings about particular subjects. Some of the
perspectives reviewed in this article originate in the US and are
grounded in moral psychology. This can be perplexing at the level
of terminology. In US moral psychology literature (Graham,
Haidt, and Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2013; Lakoff, 1996), ‘liberal’ and
‘conservative’ are used as shorthand ideal-types to denote a
propensity toward certain moral positions. In other literature,
these may sometimes be referred to through the authoritarianism/
libertarianism dichotomy (Evans, Heath, and Lalljee, 1996; Fla-
nagan and Lee, 2003; Ray, 1982; Tilley, 2005). We know that
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0119-3
2 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |  (2018) 4:62 | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0119-3 | www.nature.com/palcomms
political and moral positions are not two-dimensional; we may
thus observe an individual endorsing conservative economic
policy whilst being socially libertarian. Conversely, another
individual may endorse socialist economic policies whilst being
socially conservative. For this discussion, liberal and conservative
positions are not intended as straightforward political afﬁliations,
nor as political philosophies, but as moral positions associated
with particular moral foundations.
In the United States, there is a literature on morality policy that
surfaced in the mid-to-late 1990s (Haider-Markel and Meier,
1996; Meier, 1999; Mooney, 1999). This literature was overlooked
until recently, when a number of scholars began applying the
concept in the European context (Engeli, Green-Pedersen, and
Larsen, 2013; Heichel, Knill, and Schmitt, 2013; Knill, 2013).
Morality policy is here deﬁned as a ﬁeld where decisions are more
often based on ﬁrst principles (right and wrong). In such ﬁelds,
signiﬁcant policy change is regarded as harder to achieve because
contrasting positions are underpinned by conﬂicting, deeply held
views (Knill, 2013; Meier, 1999; Mooney, 1999). Morality policy is
thus characterised by ‘clashes of ﬁrst principles’ and ‘not […]
technical debate about whether the policy will “work” or not’
(Mooney, p 676).
Drug policy scholars and evidence advocates have long
popularised the concept of ‘what works’, derived from
evidence-based policy precepts, in order to move the debate
away from ﬁrst principles and towards pragmatic solutions and
compromise (i.e., Monaghan, 2010; Stevens, 2007; Strang et al.,
2012). Knill (2013) argues that drug policy debates happen on
two levels: a deeper level of ﬁrst-principled positions, as well as a
surface level concerned with practical implications, impact and
“what works”. Policymakers in drug policy debates are often
accused of selecting evidence in a political-tactical manner
(Stevens, 2007; Naughton, 2005). In the literature on models of
evidence utilisation, a political-tactical model features selection of
evidence that is motivated by a combination of strategic, political
and interest-driven concerns. In this view, evidence is used as
ammunition to justify action or inaction on a given issue, in an
instrumentally rational manner (Monaghan, 2011). This creates
antagonism between evidence advocates and policymakers.
Knill (2013) proposes a different reading. He categorises drug
policy as a latent morality policy, where ﬁrst-principled positions
can be strategically disguised or couched in debates about impact
and pragmatic solutions to problems, thus hiding morality
through evidence. This can be usefully applied to harm reduction.
Whilst harm reduction is driven by liberal moral values such as
tolerance, belief in universal health, individual and human rights
and promotion of civil liberties (Hathaway, 2001; Marlatt, 1996),
these values are underplayed in public health and in policy
debates. In this context, evidence is called upon to promote harm
reduction policies in an amoral, value-free manner (Strang et al.,
2012). Some believe that opting for value-neutral arguments by
framing them as evidence-based wins them political backing,
increased respect, and credibility (Beirness et al., 2008). By
standing on the shoulders of evidence, ‘harm reduction avoids
moral challenges to prohibition in favour of cost–beneﬁt analyses’
(Hathaway, 2001, p125), eschewing criticism and bypassing the
moral and the political.
The discussion between Hathaway (2001) and Keane (2003)
exposes problems that have remained latent in harm reduction as
a movement and as a practice since its inception. Hathaway calls
for the need to discard value-neutrality in favour of a value-laden,
moral commitment to harm reduction principles. He argues that
although there appear to be clear advantages to framing harm
reduction in value-free terms, its pursuit is ultimately weakened
by the lack of recognition of the shared values and principles that
inform it. Hathaway’s conclusion rests on the premise that
‘harm reduction style rhetoric, with its illusion of neutral
standing in the name of empirical reason, is strategically
ﬂawed insofar as it disavows the moral footing needed to
address prohibitionism as both an immoral and irrational
approach to drug policy’ (Hathaway, 2001, p 135).
In response to Hathaway’s challenge, Keane takes a rather
opposing stance. She argues that ‘one of the distinguishing
elements of harm reduction has been its commitment to an
amoral approach to drug use. This may not be achievable in
practice, but it is a powerful rhetorical intervention in the highly
moralised landscape of drug debate’ (Keane, 2003, p 227).
Following this logic, it seems clear that harm reduction is
assumed to be stronger when value-neutral in appearance because
it can rest on the higher grounds of evidence rather than having
to descend into messy politics and morality. This amoral and
evidence-based take on harm reduction becomes an effective
advocacy strategy ‘by framing drug use as a technical and public
health problem rather than a moral issue’ (Keane, 2003, p 229).
Although public health problems can be framed as technical
rather than value-oriented, they ultimately require normative
engagement with values and principles. According to Roe, the rift
in harm reduction reﬂects a historic tension within the move-
ment, between a moderate and medically dominated politics of
health promotion among marginalised individuals on one hand,
and an activist, transformative politics pursuing deeper structural
changes on the other (Roe, 2005, p 244). This tension will become
apparent in what follows, as advocating for drug users’ health, not
their rights (Hunt, 2004), ﬁgures as a morally and politically
palatable stance for stakeholders.
Methods
For this paper, I analysed data from 27 interviews conducted in
England, UK, and New South Wales, Australia. Interviews were
carried out as part of a PhD project focusing on understandings
and uses of evidence in drug and prostitution policy (Zampini,
2016). There is a shared political and cultural heritage between
the UK and Australia, including the key elements of language and
the similarities in their legal system, which work well to underpin
a most similar comparative design. However, potential contrasts
emerge from the diversity in the structure of their respective
political systems. Australian federalism is well rooted in the
country’s political structure. Similarly, the centralism of UK
politics, despite more recent steps toward devolution and local-
ism, is still predominant (Zampini, 2014). With the UK under-
going structural changes, devolving powers to its constituent
parts, this discussion becomes even more relevant in drug policy
(Duke and Thom, 2014; Haydock, 2015). This process entails the
possibility of assessing propositions around the relative inde-
pendence of localities to pursue policies which deviate from
national and international directives or for the possibility of
“bottom-up” initiatives to become established, which has been
done elsewhere (Zampini, 2016). This, alongside logistical and
practical ease, is the main reason smaller political units of ana-
lysis, namely England and New South Wales, were selected.
Participants were chosen due to their direct involvement in
policy-making, policy-relevant or policy-related research. Ethical
approval for carrying out interviews was given by the University
of Kent ethics committee. At ﬁrst, participants were identiﬁed
through documents including academic and grey literature, eva-
luations and reviews of relevant interventions. Participants were
purposively identiﬁed and recruited through chain-referral. Dis-
cussions verged on prominent issues in drug policy, including
harm reduction interventions, and particularly drug consumption
rooms. The analysis was an iterative process, allowing for the
principle of emergence (Archer et al., 2013) to guide
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investigation, whilst utilising existing models of the use of evi-
dence in policy as starting points, through the logic of adaptive
coding (Layder, 1998).
Participants ranged from serving parliamentarians to
grassroots-level advocates. This not only implies diversity in the
sample, it also signiﬁes differences of status, degree of involve-
ment in individual issues, and understandings and deployment of
evidence. Participants’ varied professional backgrounds were
grouped into three overarching categories: researchers (includes
medical/practitioners), politicians (includes political advisors,
civil servants and bureaucrats) and advocates (includes knowl-
edge brokers). However, categories often intertwined, with some
participants belonging to two or more. Quotes have been assigned
using numbers preceded by the identiﬁers AU for Australia and
UK for Britain, and clearly stating the participants’ professional
background(s). Identifying participants’ multiple professional
background is regarded as relevant because it contributes to
understanding their position vis-a-vis their experience and
training.
Whereas the uses and understandings of evidence were set
themes in the interviews, which led to establishing codes derived
from existing models of evidence utilisation (linear; enlight-
enment; political-tactical; interactive; evolutionary; dialogical and
processual models as discussed by Weiss, 1979 and Monaghan,
2011), values, emotions, experience, and beliefs were emergent
themes in participants’ accounts. These themes were con-
ceptualised as belonging in the realm of morality. Participants
variously referred to morality, moral positions, and value-based,
emotional or cognitive biases as barriers to the proper use of
evidence in policy. This warranted reﬂection and analysis of the
proposed dichotomy between evidence and morality.
Selective use of evidence: no mere instrumental cherry-picking.
Participants saw the production and presentation of evidence as
strategically and politically necessary. Beyond that, evidence was
purported to have neutralising properties in what was regarded as
a highly polarised domain. However, most participants argued
that stakeholders treat evidence selectively. Yet their selective
attention is not simply instrumental, but shaped by their moral
values, politics, experience, professional training, and occupation.
Participants mostly agreed that evidence could only go so far in
informing people’s views, because:
people will latch on to policy recommendations and
conclusions that ﬁt with […] their view of the world […].
People have an underlying ethos of values and they frame
their interpretation of the evidence around that. (UK
Researcher/ Knowledge Broker 23)
Here, the participant stresses interpretation and framing of
evidence as ﬁltered through one’s ethos of values. In the case of
the UK Home Affairs Select Committee on drugs (2012), the
Home Secretary had a clear agenda to criticise Portuguese drug
policy, which was identiﬁed as:
selective use of evidence in order to support a prior
position, rather than seeking to look at the evidence […]
with a purported objectivity. (UK Politician 19)
In this instance, the Home Secretary framed her claims as
based on evidence, or lack of evidence, as a justiﬁcation for
dismissal of the Portuguese approach. Can a political-tactical aim
be easily distinguished from a moral, value-based opposition? The
Home Secretary’s position might have been political-tactical in
aim (Weiss, 1979), though at the same time it may have been
founded upon disagreement on ﬁrst principles (Mooney, 1999). It
appears that stakeholders can satisfy both their strategic interest
and their moral stance, without needing to make their moral
stance manifest, by claiming that their position is evidence-based.
Few stakeholders are comfortable with overtly stating their
moral position in the drug policy debate. Thus, they keep the
focus on evidence, while engaging in debates about instrumental
objectives. This is a typical trait of latent morality policy (Knill,
2013), where selective use of evidence allows stakeholders to stick
with their pre-held view whilst justifying it through scientiﬁc
authoritativeness, or lack thereof. Thus, evidence is not simply
selected instrumentally, which would be political-tactical in aim:
Where evidence supports a particular policy, great. When it
contradicts it, then people would be less interested. […]
Some degree of selective attention to what supports our
world view (UK Researcher/Knowledge Broker 25)
The idea of selective attention is useful because it suggests that
individuals order and weigh evidence differently, not necessarily
according to the evidence quality per se, but according to their
deeply held views based on their principled positions (Zampini,
2016).
Still, the production and presentation of evidence was regarded
as strategically and politically necessary, and beyond that,
evidence was believed to have neutralising properties. Based on
participants’ responses, the targeted production of evidence was
useful in the debates surrounding the establishment and
continuation of a Medically Supervised Injecting Centre in
Sydney:
it was the neutralising factor of having […] that evaluation
[…] going on, it was producing reports all the time… it was
just forming that wall around the centre that shielded it.
(AU Political Advisor 8)
In this case, evidence was useful to “neutralise” a politically
heated debate surrounding a controversial intervention. In other
words, the framing of this debate in terms of evidence of
effectiveness, rather than values such as human rights, was
politically useful. The reliance on evidence to shelter interven-
tions which are politically difﬁcult to justify was noted by
participants in relation to other harm reduction policies including
needle and syringe exchange and opiate substitution treatment.
Exposure to evidence appeared, in some cases, to render people
less entrenched and more willing to engage in debates. In one case
where the participant had led a DELPHI exercise with a diverse
range of stakeholders, they noted that:
some people in this world […] are just so entrenched, but
the majority of people who did come from a range of
different perspectives were able to move forward and
engage sensibly. (UK Researcher/Civil Servant 26)
Sensible engagement in debates might refer to people’s ability
to shift their focus away from their deeply held views and towards
instrumental discussion about interventions (Knill, 2013),
potentially fostering understanding and compromise. The same
participant inferred this when stating:
if people could actually discuss the evidence and their
different views on it and have […] a discussion that doesn’t
necessarily attack people’s perspectives then […] you can
make progress. (UK Researcher/Civil Servant 26).
Here, the participant makes a distinction between discussing
the evidence and discussing people’s perspectives, which would
imply directly engaging with their values and moral positions.
In contrast with the idea that actors, and particularly those
whose political stakes are higher, use evidence selectively to make
political gains while supporting their pre-held views, there are
instances of powerful actors in both countries who took the
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evidence on board even when it contradicted their existing
position. Below is one example:
one Drug Minister said to me ‘look, I went into this
thinking one thing, but when the ACMD1 came back to me
with their facts and their explanations, I took that on board,
acted on their conclusions, on their recommendations’, so
even though they had […] different values going into it,
they didn’t impose that. (UK Knowledge Broker 23)
This suggests that some stakeholders place evidence above
values because they believe that evidence is value-free, or at least
less value-laden than their own moral position. In such cases,
upholding a fact/value distinction offers clear political gains for
evidence advocates.
Participants believed that evidence-based policy was the only
rational and just principle on which to base drug policy, and as
such they were all nominally committed to it. As Boswell (2018)
argued, evidence-based policy is the ‘secular faith’ that binds
stakeholders together, and a very useful myth to uphold and
frame to deploy. However, participants’ accounts suggest a
propensity for some stakeholders to associate moralism with
views which are opposed to those they themselves hold. There are
many examples of this in the public domain. The Global Drug
Policy Commission published its latest report, introducing it with
the following paragraph:
‘Drug policy reforms have been difﬁcult to design, legislate
or implement because current policies and responses are
often based on perceptions and passionate beliefs, and what
should be factual discussions leading to effective policies are
frequently treated as moral debates. The present report
aims to analyse the most common perceptions and fears,
contrast them with available evidence on drugs and the
people who use them, and provides recommendations on
changes that must be enacted to support reforms toward
more effective drug policies.’ (Global Commission on Drug
Policy, 2017)
There is a tendency to view, or at least present, the other’s
position as moral, and one’s own position as evidence-based.
Participants would thus place evidence on one side of the
spectrum, and morality and politics on the opposite side,
reinforcing the antagonism between evidence advocates and
policymakers:
there is so much around the drugs debate that is morally
and ideologically driven, that often I feel that politicians
actually don’t care what the evidence base is (UK Knowl-
edge Broker 25).
The case of expert opposition to the Medically Supervised
Injecting Centre in Sydney provides an example. In the quote
below, the participant doubts the credibility of those experts who
opposed the intervention, suggesting that, had they been “true”
experts, they could not possibly have opposed it, so they must be
using their scientiﬁc expertise to disguise their moral opposition:
we also had so-called experts who opposed the injecting
centre […] I say so-called because I would doubt the
validity of some of the experts that criticised the injecting
centre (AU Political Advisor 8).
Often, evidence advocates portray themselves as amoral, and
contrast morality with evidence, and beliefs and perceptions with
factual discussions centred on effectiveness. This strategy is
perceived as successful because morality is conceptualised as
moralism, and therefore seen as reactionary, emotional and
subjective, whereas evidence is conceptualised as progressive,
rational and objective.
In some cases, robust evidence of effectiveness of an
intervention is not accumulated until that intervention is already
in place on a reasonably wide scale. Early Needle and Syringe
Programmes were rolled out before robust evidence of their
effectiveness was accumulated. Today,
even without a randomised controlled trial for needle
syringe programmes, we still can draw a conclusion that
needle syringe programmes do reduce HIV infection […]
and we can say that with a very high degree of certainty in
an area which is a mineﬁeld of emotional antagonism (AU
Medical Researcher 2)
Here, the participant exposes how the evidence trumps
emotional antagonism around the issue of needle and syringe
distribution; in other words, how evidence wins over emotion and
values. However, this bypasses the values and emotions which
would have motivated harm reduction activists to start needle
exchange as an informal practice based on epidemiological
evidence alone, and prior to systematic accumulation of evidence
of its effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. In Amsterdam, where
the ﬁrst needle and syringe programme was established in 1984, it
was the local ‘Junky Union’ that began to informally distribute
clean needles before the scheme was formally introduced by the
municipal government (Coutinho, 2000, p 1387). In this instance,
needle exchange appears to be motivated by a moral imperative to
protect people from disease and death. It was a political initiative
of civil disobedience led by those activists which Roe (2005)
identiﬁed as pivotal to the creation of the movement.
The establishment of the Medically Supervised Injecting Centre
in Sydney followed a similar pattern: local medical practitioners
and activists started a medically supervised injecting centre
illegally, partly as a strategy to gain political attention, but also
because they believed that, morally, it was the right thing to do
(Wodak et al., 2003; Zampini, 2014). Indeed, they could rely on
evidence from other countries where the intervention was already
in place, but was evidence primary in motivating their actions?
Evidence alone is not sufﬁcient to motivate an intervention.
Moral and political convictions need to precede, or at least
accompany, evidence of effectiveness.
Liberal morality and harm reduction. The perception that
political support for harm reduction comes from economic and
scientiﬁc, rather than moral grounds, was shared among parti-
cipants. Harm reduction interventions appeared easier to justify,
both publicly and politically, on the basis of value-for-money. An
economic principle thus overrides moral concerns for the health
and rights of drug users.
I used to think that people would make decisions based on
things like human rights, or just people’s health, but
actually to make a decision […] these days unless you’ve
got an economic argument that also justiﬁes it, you’ll ﬁnd it
that much harder to get support for it. (UK Researcher/
Advocate 21)
In line with a managerialist culture dominating the UK and
Australian public health sectors (Germov, 2005; Pollitt, 2016), a
value-free approach to harm prevails, whereby the rational
calculation of harms is carried out in economic terms (Lenton
and Single, 1998, p 219). When discussing the possibility of
establishing a drug consumption room in the UK, one participant
stated: 'my issue with this [...] it's never been a moral one. It's a
cost-effectiveness issue' (UK Civil Servant/Advocate 22). In this
case, a concern for cost-effectiveness prevails over a moral
concern for the health and rights of drug users as a matter of
political strategy. Drug users occupy a low place in the hierarchy
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of deservingness in society (a position that is value-based, Skinner
et al., 2007). This, coupled with the relatively widespread
perception that drug use is immoral, renders them both
structurally constrained and immoral agents, in the eyes of some
(Stevens, 2011).
According to Pauly (2008), harm reduction principles address
issues of social justice by understanding access to health as
structurally inequitable. A liberal morality implies an acceptance
that people should not be judged for their choices and behaviours.
Whilst maintaining a strong normative position on the right to
health, in moral terms, harm reduction remains a liberal stance
given the absence of judgement toward the individual and respect
toward their choice. Thus, harm reduction rests on ideas and
principles rooted in universal health alongside a liberal moral
attitude towards the individual. For Stevens, ‘the answer to the
question of whether there is a right to drug use appears to be yes.
But it is a rather small yes’ (2011, p 236). Judgements among
harm reduction stakeholders are split, with many supporting
medicalised, dependent drug use whilst denying recreational use,
which is considered more morally ambiguous (McKeganey,
2011). Given the clout of science and medicine in shaping both
the understanding and enabling of drug use within a public health
frame, an individualistic, rights-based approach to drugs is harder
to justify politically (Hunt, 2004).
Despite an overwhelming commitment to evidence as a just
basis for decision-making in drug policy and harm reduction,
when referring to certain aspects of drug policy such as the
consequences of prohibition, some evidence advocates, who
deﬁned themselves as supporting evidence-based policy ‘to a
fanatical degree’ (AU Medical Researcher 2), express a sense of
injustice on moral grounds.
Is it fair and just that the majority who prefer, say, alcohol
or tobacco, […] wants to punish people who have a
different drug preference? (AU Medical Researcher 2)
A preference entails a degree of choice, and thus expands
beyond the medical to encompass rights, and even pleasure. The
above statement also appeals to a fairness principle, which is a
moral foundation typically mobilised by liberals (Graham, Haidt
and Nosek, 2009). Prior to the establishment of the Medically
Supervised Injecting Centre in Sydney, participants acknowledged
that those who began running an injecting centre illegally, did so:
On the basis of an ethical belief […] it was a competing
principle which was given much higher weight than
somebody else’s set of principles about some universal idea
[…] the good thing about harm reduction as a principle is it
does allow those negotiated responses. (AU Medical
Researcher 4)
This statement implies that there is a moral basis for people’s
decision to support harm reduction interventions, even if they do
so illegally. Yet it also implies that harm reduction as a principle
can accommodate moral diversity. Some participants appeared to
support Keane’s (2003) view that the strength of harm reduction
is its apparent value-neutrality and moral ambiguity. However, as
Roe (2005) noted, although harm reduction presupposes a lack of
value judgement towards individuals’ choices, it does still rest on
the values of universal welfare and universal healthcare. As one
participant put it:
Philosophically we work from a position of health for all
and a belief that our target populations have traditionally
had poor access […] to healthcare and that healthcare
needs to be equitable. (AU Medical practitioner 12)
Participants have emphasised the increased difﬁculty of
gathering political support to fund treatment in times of austerity.
The economic argument against prohibition, which would
emphasise states’ ability to raise tax revenue from regulating
drugs, has not often translated into a signiﬁcant policy change in
a different direction, perhaps with the exception of certain US
states (Room, 2014). When referring to the money spent on the
Medically Supervised Injecting Centre in Sydney, which has been
the subject of multiple evaluations, one participant asked:
Why are we making such song and dance about this three
million dollars when there are zillions of dollars spent
across the sector and across other sectors and none of that
gets evaluated? Why do we never evaluate the money that
gets spent on prohibition, for example? (AU Medical
Researcher 7)
The participant’s frustration is motivated by the perceived
hypocrisy arising from the lack of investment in the production of
targeted evidence evaluating law enforcement expenditure vis-à-
vis successful interventions. This might indicate that value-for-
money, an overriding principle in the multiple evaluations of the
Medically Supervised Injecting Centre (MSIC Evaluation Com-
mittee, 2003), is not necessarily the main value which pushes drug
policy in one direction or another.
In the context of a paradigm shift toward conservatism in UK
politics, participants noted how drug use and addiction were
reframed to ﬁt the ideology of austerity.
Drug addiction is [depicted as] the cause of poverty. So
poverty ceases to be about not having enough money, and
becomes the failings of the poor and the individual. So it ﬁts
with an individualist political strand of thought and with a
moral strand of thought (UK Civil Servant/Advocate 22)
In such conservative times of austerity, the abstinence and
recovery arguments were mounted on moral grounds (Stevens
and Zampini, 2018).
By critiquing maintenance prescribing, [the Conservatives]
tick moral boxes for the authoritarian and religious right
(UK Civil Servant/Advocate 22)
In this context, can advocates who subscribe to harm
reduction–and its liberal moral underpinnings - challenge
value-laden, moral arguments with evidence-based, value neutral
ones?
Commitment to harm reduction: the power of emotional
engagement. When reﬂecting on the inﬂuence of professional
background and experience on individuals’ values and attitudes,
and speciﬁcally the differences between advocates and policy-
makers, one participant noted that:
Most of the people in NGOs are there because of some
belief system they have, […] and they are committed to it,
[…] whereas conversely most people in governmental
structures are by their nature not particularly driven by the
subject they are dealing with. (UK Advocate/Knowledge
Broker/Civil Servant 20)
This reveals the common-held assumption that advocates are
subject and value-driven, whereas politicians and bureaucrats are
not. However, interview data suggests that the degree of
individuals’ engagement with drug policy and harm reduction
will depend on the extent and nature of their experience and
exposure to issues drug users face. If that individual is a Minister,
a Premier or a Prime Minister, the likelihood that drug policy and
harm reduction will ﬁgure highly on the political agenda appears
to increase proportionately. For example, in New South Wales,
the fact that Premier Bob Carr’s brother died of a drug overdose
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0119-3
6 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |  (2018) 4:62 | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0119-3 | www.nature.com/palcomms
apparently pushed drug policy higher on the political agenda,
which favoured the 1999 Drug Summit initiative, as well as the
establishment of a ground-breaking harm reduction intervention
as the Medically Supervised Injecting Centre (Zampini, 2014):
The Premier, who had lost a brother to drug overdose, who
was quite ambivalent, he is quite a conservative person Bob
Carr, but […] he put aside his own feelings, and […] he let
it go through. […] If he had said no, that was it. Game over,
right from the start. (AU Political Advisor 8)
In this quote, the participant suggests that the premier’s
feelings, underpinned by his conservative stance, would have
acted as a barrier to the implementation of the intervention. The
question remains, if the Premier’s brother had not died of an
overdose, would he have been able to empathise, to relate with the
reality of a person who uses drugs, and consequently dedicate
time and resources to drug policy reform?
In a similar vein, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke
(1983–1991) had instigated commitment to drug policy reform
and harm reduction at the federal level, bumping it up the
political agenda, because of his personal story:
His daughter had a heroin addiction, and he broke down on
TV and cried, and that was the start of a national campaign
against drug abuse, based on the personal situation of the
Prime Minister at the time, the one he was facing at home
with one of his kids, so that was enough to drive change…
That was the start of the national strategy, it was driven out
the PM’s ofﬁce. (AU Knowledge Broker 3)
For an individual to dedicate attention to this area, it appears
that a moral and emotional commitment is somewhat necessary.
This is also true for scientists, who might choose to engage in a
form of research activism underpinned by a moral commitment
to research for social change and justice, because:
It’s not […] a “nice” area to do research, […] I mean these
are people’s lives! (AU Medical Researcher 5)
Beneath the commitment to a rigorous, medical model to run
services focusing on drug-using clients, there is a shared belief
that the health needs and rights of these populations are generally
not well catered for and that a principle of harm reduction should
underpin these services:
It all came together to give me an incredible interest in sex,
drugs and the public health issues around those […] our
system didn’t cater well to those populations […] I was
quite inspired by the model that was recommended […]
which would be non-judgemental, respectful, harm reduc-
tion in its focus (AU Medical Researcher 7)
In this instance, harm reduction is understood as a manner to
tackle structural inequities and pursue change. This is consistent
with other participants’ accounts of their initial involvement in
this area. Participants seem to pick their subject not only out of
training or necessity, but out of a value commitment. Although
stakeholders with a political or public service background are by
their nature generalists, and do not get to pick their subject, they
will choose to be more or less invested in particular issues
depending on their values and experience.
Participants broadly recognise that human beings, including
researchers, are subject to the limitations brought about by their
beliefs and morals:
There are some things that you won’t necessarily change
which may be your […] personal beliefs and morals and
they do inﬂuence how you perceive evidence or react to it.
(UK Researcher/Civil Servant 26)
This is not only the product of politics or ideology, but also the
result of emotional and cognitive biases (Parkhurst, 2016), which,
despite being recognised, continue to be portrayed as negative
because irrational.
The human mind is perhaps not as rational as we might
wish and is subject to various biases and preconceptions
and different ways of being inﬂuenced by data and linking
those to consistency with an existing view of the world (UK
Politician 19)
Positivist notions, such as the reason/emotion dualism, limit
the possibility of using emotional engagement both as a legitimate
ground for reasoning (Sayer, 2011) and as a subject of analysis.
The role of values and emotions for the purposes of mobilisation
and underpinning change has been rescued and discussed in
philosophical, sociological and political science literatures (Sayer,
2011; Nussbaum, 2003; Pedwell, 2014; Clarke, Hoggett and
Thompson, 2006). However, despite some notable exceptions
(i.e., Valentine, 2009), and albeit the literature on the use of
evidence in policy acknowledges moral values, their sources and
impacts are under-theorised, and explanations tend to emphasise
interests, rather than values.
Evidence continues to be seen by many as a useful tool which
enables people to focus their thoughts away from their values and
principles. Doing so might provide a middle ground for practical
reasoning:
You to some extent separate out those beliefs that are
probably not subject to change because they are very
integral to your […] world view […] and so how you
interpret the evidence can be […] worked on […] without
having to require people to change their fundamental […]
underpinning world view. (UK Researcher/Civil Servant 26)
The drug policy debate is an emotional realm, with polarised
views associated with cognitive and emotional biases, morality
and politics. In this context, some participants emphasised that
anecdotes in the form of personal stories, due to their accessible,
emotions-ridden nature, go further than scientiﬁc evidence in
their ability to foster people’s understanding of drug policy issues.
Below, one participant claims that his story was a powerful driver
in shifting audiences’ attitudes towards drugs and drug use.
They say how much their attitude changed about drugs and
drug use just by listening to my story and my presentation
[…] I can speak to a group of people and I can actually
change their minds about drug policy […] I use the
emotion, yeah, and it is effective (AU Advocate 10)
With a direct reference to using emotions, the participant
exposes the potential of fostering emotional engagement for
underpinning attitude change. Other participants who did not
come from a scientiﬁc background and who more often dealt with
lay audiences, told of how stories and personiﬁed accounts could
move people more than numbers, even though, they said, one
needs to use both. It is noteworthy that knowledge-brokers,
advocates and activists, more so than researchers, are purpose-
fully engaging audiences emotionally through the use of personal
stories, aiming at empathic understanding of the issues drug users
face.
Discussion: moral foundations, framing, and mobilising
empathy. Among other outcomes, the rise of scientiﬁc over
religious organisation of beliefs (Gieryn, 1983) contributed to
shifting the moral domain away from the community and toward
the individual in the west. Within this process, which affected
both western liberals and conservatives (Haidt, 2013), liberals are
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certainly further attached to science as ‘secular faith’ (Boswell,
2018; Zampini, 2016), and to individual freedom as foundational
in their value system (Haidt, 2013). The liberal to conservative
spectrum is complex, and is characterised by varied, internally
contradictory, and periodically changing positions, which do not
easily align with either individualised or community-based loci of
moral values (expressed as the individualising-binding dichotomy
[Graham, Haidt and Nosek, 2009]).
Although the moral spectrum is not two-dimensional, and
moral foundations theory was put forth in order to express moral
complexity, it has been observed that the importance of certain
moral foundations is greater for liberals than it is for
conservatives. Speciﬁcally, liberals are more concerned with care,
harm and fairness, whereas conservatives are more concerned
with issues related with in-group protection (i.e., family or
community), authority, loyalty and sanctity (Graham, Haidt and
Nosek, 2009). According to Haidt (2013, p 181), not only can
conservatives appeal to care and fairness, they also have ‘a near
monopoly’ over authority, sanctity and loyalty; he calls this the
‘conservative advantage’. Although conservatives may have been
pioneers in investing in harm reduction (i.e., in the UK under
Thatcher), this has been regarded as primarily motivated by a
need to protect the in-group (i.e., the healthy, law-abiding
population) from the threat of drugs and drug users (i.e., the
infected/criminal population) (MacGregor, 2017). Conservatives
would thus primarily rely on authority, sanctity, and loyalty as
foundations to justify commitment to harm reduction. Though
conservatives are indeed motivated by moral foundations of care
and fairness, these are less primary because they exist in
conjunction with other foundations, rather than reigning supreme,
and as such they are interpreted and acted upon differently.
Liberals are comparatively unconcerned and even rejecting of
loyalty, authority and sanctity as foundational to morality (Haidt,
2013). Liberals’ positions in drug policy can be conceptualised as
resting on two axes: a rights-based axis, framing arguments
around the human rights of drug users, and a public health/
universal health axis, framing arguments around drug users’
inequitable access to health. In moral foundations terms, the care
and fairness foundations underpin these positions and are
primary in shaping liberals’ demands. Interestingly in harm
reduction debates, the ‘weak’ right to health is advocated much
more openly and widely than the ‘strong’ right to use drugs
(Hunt, 2004). Other than the ability to justify the former through
an evidence-based framing, this might also be tied to the
individualistic nature of a rights-based argument, versus a public
health frame’s more universalist concern. It seems clear that
openly advocating for the right to use drugs is perceived as a
politically risky strategy.
According to Haidt (2013), liberal morality is problematic in
terms of framing. Liberals may ﬁnd it harder than conservatives to
make explicitly moral arguments because of their contemporaneous
commitment to the individual (and her/his freedom), as well as
universalism, versus conservatives’ commitment to community and
in-group protection. As such, a public health framing may generally
be perceived as more successful, and less morally controversial, than
a rights-based framing. Conservatives, who can appeal to the full
spectrum of moral foundations and are comparatively less
concerned with individual freedom (Graham, Haidt and Nosek,
2009), may ﬁnd it easier to explicitly frame their arguments in
moral terms. Indeed, conservative arguments for recovery and
abstinence are well supported by the moral foundations of sanctity,
loyalty and authority (Stevens and Zampini, 2018).
A parallel view focusing on the relationship between morality
and emotions is that of Lakoff (1996). He distinguishes a ‘strict
father’ from a ‘nurturant parent’ morality. The former, associated
with conservatives, is one that responds more strongly to fear and
anxiety, whereas the latter is mobilised by empathy. Interestingly,
a conservative morality as conceptualised by Lakoff is founded
upon the mechanism of reward and punishment. He argues that
‘rewards for obedience and punishments for disobedience are
crucial to maintaining moral authority; as such, they lie at the
heart of this moral system and are thus moral.’ (1996, p 164).
Drug policy is manifestly based on mechanisms of reward (for
those who abstain) and punishment (for those who use).
Conversely, Lakoff argues that, for liberals, ‘the primacy of
morality as empathy makes empathy a priority’ (1996, p 166).
Empathy is seen as a fundamental element of liberal morality.
Lakoff follows on to argue that
‘morality as fairness is a consequence; if you empathise with
others, you will want them to be treated fairly. This makes
empathetic actions and actions promoting fairness into
moral actions. Consequently, a lack of empathetic beha-
viour, or actions going against fairness, are immoral’ for
liberals (ibid).
Empathy, fairness and care are characteristics of a liberal
morality and can be associated with harm reduction, expressed as
concern for people’s health and rights.
As we have observed, some participants owed their commit-
ment to harm reduction speciﬁcally to their experiential exposure,
which enabled empathy and mobilised foundations of care and
fairness. Advocates and knowledge brokers who more often dealt
with lay audiences including politicians and the public,
emphasised that evidence should not remain abstract (i.e.,
presented through “impersonal” data and statistics) but should
be personiﬁed through life narratives to allow for emotions and
empathy to play a role and “bring it home to people” (AU
Knowledge Broker 3). By way of example, stakeholders have
reported that drug-related deaths increased drastically in the past
few years in the UK. However, there has been no further
investment in harm reduction services despite the tireless work of
advocates who are exposing the magnitude of the problem
through numbers and headlines (ACMD, 2016; Dearden, 2017;
BBC, 2017; EMCDDA, 2017).
An alternative strategy would be to frame this issue in terms of
individual experiences, presenting case studies in the form of live
documents, stories and life narratives of people living with, and
dying from, addiction, alongside those numbers. In this way,
whilst registering the scale of the problem through statistics, an
emotional connection might be enabled, encouraging moral
responses underpinned by empathy. If stakeholders’ moral
foundations are already skewed towards care and fairness, and
if empathy is primary in the way that they operate, then advocates
may have a good chance to garner support. If stakeholders’ moral
foundations are skewed towards authority, loyalty and sanctity,
advocates may well have a more difﬁcult task at hand. Yet, as
moral foundation theorists posit, alternate foundations, albeit not
primary, are still present and can be mobilised. This requires
developing strategies around different moral framings that may
appeal to different stakeholders in the debate.
Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that analysis of harm reduction in
terms of morality provides an interesting angle to transcend the
evidence/politics dualism that brought evidence-based policy-
making to its impasse. Despite initial gains through the promo-
tion of an amoral, economically driven harm reduction, political
backing in both the UK and Australia is now waning in favour of
less tolerant stances toward drug use, with much greater emphasis
on recovery and abstinence, mounted on moral grounds (Ber-
ridge, 2012; Duke, 2013; Lancaster et al., 2015). Although ﬁghting
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politics and morals with evidence might be perceived as advan-
tageous on the surface, the extent to which value-neutral argu-
ments manage to achieve value-driven goals is called into
question. Partly through a process of de-moralisation, harm
reduction lost its original objective–to ensure the health and
rights of drug users – whilst becoming a compromised, money-
saving, crime-reducing set of measures deployed to fulﬁl interests
outside those of drug users themselves (Hunt and Stevens, 2004).
The rapidly increasing number of opioid-related deaths in the
UK over the past few years is testament of the disinvestment in
strategies aimed at ensuring drug users’ health and rights
(ACMD; 2016). This evidence, despite being made manifest by
evidence advocates, has been repeatedly downplayed and even
ignored (Stevens, 2017). In Australia, a rising trend in fatal
overdoses, and a parallel trend in the rise of the recovery dis-
course, have been identiﬁed (Roxburgh and Burns, 2012; Lan-
caster et al., 2015), while ﬂuctuations in availability of heroin have
made drugs such as OxyContin, and later more powerful drug
Fentanyl, popular and deadly alternatives (Roxburgh et al., 2013).
The data analysed from England and New South Wales show
some uniformity in terms of participants’ agreement that evi-
dence is a useful tool in drug policy debates in that it can render
people less entrenched. Uniformity across the two countries is
also visible in the manner stakeholders described their engage-
ment in the drug policy debate. However, some important dif-
ferences between participants were noted. Researchers and other
stakeholders with a scientiﬁc or public service background were
more likely to claim that their views are grounded in evidence.
They shared a tendency to present morality as moralism, and as
inimical to sound reasoning. On the other hand, advocates and
knowledge brokers were more attuned to engaging morally and
emotively. These actors suggested that, in their experience, what
is more likely to spark commitment and understanding is
experiential and personal in character, implying that values and
emotions would be more obviously apparent. This goes against
the perceived wisdom of neutralising emotions in favour of
pursuing nominally value-free evidence. Ultimately, emotional
engagement and value commitment need to accompany engage-
ment with a subject and with relevant evidence.
Emotional engagement and value commitment thus encourage
involvement and understanding, underpinning change. Devel-
oping better tools for analysing the role of morality, values and
emotions in decision-making, engaging with insights from moral
psychology alongside policy analysis, is paramount to the study of
the politics of evidence-based policymaking. More speciﬁcally, the
moral foundations framework highlights that morality operates
differently depending on individuals’ positions on the liberal/
conservative spectrum. This invites reﬂection on the way different
moral foundations can be mobilised in harm reduction debates.
Whereas conservatives appeal to all moral foundations (care,
fairness, authority, loyalty and sanctity), liberals primarily appeal
to care and fairness, rejecting other foundations. Furthermore,
liberals respond more easily to empathy and conservatives are
more easily mobilised by fear. This has implications for the way
they may engage with drug policy debates and for the way
advocates may wish to frame their arguments.
Evidence-based policy advocates who are reticent to be openly
moral and engage audiences emotionally may ﬁnd that, though
initially successful, this strategy has limited gains. This is because
the motivation behind people’s commitment to drug policy and
harm reduction rests on moral grounds, irrespective of whether
the person is a researcher, an advocate, or a high-ranking poli-
tician. It is necessary to place this under further scientiﬁc scru-
tiny, as there is a tendency towards further polarisation, given the
antagonism that arises from the split between a supposed
evidence-based position and a supposed moral and political other.
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Notes
1 Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, is a UK statutory body that provides
scientiﬁc advice on matters pertaining illicit drugs and their misuse. It was established
in 1971 with the passing of the Misuse of Drugs Act.
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